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The security industry can be defined, in the first instance, as the industry that produces 
the goods and services required to protect citizens from insecurity. Yet, this industry, as 
opposed to defence, has not been an area of intense research. Their boundaries are 
unclear and the industry is not well characterised.  
 
This paper analyses this knowledge gap and presents some ideas for a research agenda 
for this industry that could assist in unveiling the main features, the potential 
weaknesses and strengths, and the capability to solve the security needs of society in an 
efficient and effective way. The paper discusses a definition of this economic sector 
useful in setting its boundaries, and it briefly describes the main types of industries 
operating within the sector. It analyses methods for gathering information regarding the 
industry, customers, and other market agents. Finally, it outlines ways for assessing 
market performance in terms of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm.  
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1   This research has been partly financed by the 7
th European Research Framework Program in the field of 
Security.   2
Security is a fundamental good without which societies cannot prosper. Investment in 
security provides relevant benefits preventing or reducing damage to life and property 
and increasing resilience
2 to recover quickly from a security incident, whatever its 
nature. This investment may diminish the risk that the incident spills over into other 
activities, sectors and economies and ends up disrupting society’s key functions due to 
the strong interdependencies of modern society. An adequate investment in this area 
may enhance what is known as secure growth where the confidence of citizens and the 
general welfare of the society blossom. Yet, benefits of security investments are not 
often easy to measure. For example one cannot accurately determine how many 
criminal or terrorist activities have been prevented due to improved security. 
 
Security spending involves investment in human resources as well as on means required 
to support activities aimed at reducing threats and mitigating their potential damages 
e.g. large intelligence database systems or personal protective equipment for security 
personnel. These means, whilst unable per se to provide security, properly used, can 
improve it largely. Here the security industry is considered as the collection of 
economic agents that produces these means in terms of goods and services.  
 
The capability to find and offer new technical solutions to security problems 
characterised by increased citizen confidence and low cost, is the most appropriate 
measure of success in this economic sector
3. Whilst these expenditures may be 
considered as a sort of societal burden, they also provide other relevant benefits in terms 
of job creation, industrial capabilities, profits to shareholders, and innovations 
                                                 
2   Resilience reduces large scale shocks and the intimidation of a huge citizen audience thereby frustrating 
the goals of terrorists. 
3   The use of finger biometry to protect laptops and personal digital assistants (PDAs) could be a good 
example.    3
applicable in other economic sectors. In short, this type of spending has positive effects 
on the general industrial and technological base of society, contributing to economic 
wealth in the long run
4.  
 
However, few things are known about this economic sector. Information regarding 
economic figures, industrial capabilities, market conditions, structure of the industry, 
conduct of agents, and performance is not plentiful, and it may not be very accurate. 
Therefore, an agenda to generate knowledge is clearly required. 
 
This paper presents a research agenda identifying areas and methods to improve 
knowledge of the security industry with particular emphasis on the European Union. 
Main themes addressed are: the boundaries of the sector, an overview of the main types 
of industries, methods to collect information, the analysis of suppliers, stakeholders and 
demand drivers, and the performance analysis. The rational that supports the agenda, the 
different approaches and the potential difficulties in implementing this agenda are 
detailed. The paper ends with a brief conclusion. 
 
 
BOUNDARIES OF THE SECTOR 
 
The first challenge to address should be the establishment of clear boundaries of the 
sector that identifies which undertakings should be included or excluded from the 
research. For such a purpose a definition of the sector would be helpful. An objective 
definition is not easy since subjective factors based on beliefs and preferences of the 
                                                 
4  Investment in security always has an opportunity cost, raising the unresolved question regarding its 
application in other activities that could further increase society welfare and growth. For example, due 
to the high number of car accidents, investments could be made more effective in road or car safety.   4
author may be subtly slipped into the final wording. With this in mind, a pragmatic 
definition is presented, illustrated with brief comments surrounding the reasons behind 
such a definition. 
 
The security industry is the industry that addresses all the products and services used 
specifically by the human being to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, reduce, palliate 
and deal with the threats and the consequences that undesired events have on our 
society. These consequences may be summarised in terms of damage to people’s life, 
health, property or other assets, including information. 
 
The first part of the definition tries to address all the supporting activities, in terms of 
goods and services, needed to diminish risk. No explicit distinction is made on the 
beneficiary, because it is assumed that is society and their citizens. Since a security 
incident triggers a response aimed at mitigating their consequences an explicit reference 
is made to this term. However, long term activities and the associated means related to 
restoration and recovery of the situation to pre-event levels such as basic services 
restoration, repair and reconstruction, financial and economic recovery, etc. should be 
considered outside the scope of this industry, as long as their methods and activities do 
not differ essentially from the everyday routine activities of operation, repair or 
upgrade. 
 
The most problematic part of the definition is the term “undesired events”. These events 
can be distinguished because they create fear or insecurity in citizens. Whilst this 
feeling is to some extent subjective, it can be estimated based on interviews as shown in 




Based on the above figure, five main sources of insecurity can be identified: armed 
conflicts, terrorism, organised crime, pandemics, and natural or man-made disasters. As 
can be seen, the two most relevant areas of insecurity are terrorism and organised crime. 
The industry related to these two sources of insecurity share large commonalities in 
terms of products and services. However, it has not been surveyed in depth, as opposed 
to the exhaustively explored defence industry. The former industry, despite of sharing 
some commonalities and similarities with the defence industry, also differs largely in 
terms of customer, products, and technologies.  
 
Other major risks faced fundamentally with the support of the health industry are 
diseases and pandemics; however this industry is also related to terrorism and organised 
crime since similar measures are applied to defeat a chemical or biological attack.  
 
The industry related to natural (floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, forest fires) or man-
made disasters (technological or industrial accidents usually known as safety industry) 
addresses the response to hazards that cause damage without purposeful action. Whilst 
the same kind of equipment is shared for mitigating damages originated by terrorism 
and organised crime, the preventive means are of a very different nature (e.g. weather 
prediction systems). Principal customers of this industry are more closely related to 
health, civil protection and environmental protection agencies rather than law 
enforcement.  
   6
This paper will focus on the industries that address the risks associated with terrorism, 
organized crime, and natural or man-made disasters, with special emphasis on the first 
two, which are considered the most relevant sources of insecurity. This view is similar 
to the EU vision
5, the CEN BT/WG 161
6 and the Department of Homeland Security 
(Bush, 2002).  
 
Measures may be split into two main activities. The first intends to prevent terror and 
criminal action, offering these groups opportunities and incentives to change their 
behaviour abandoning and replacing their criminal activities with legal ones
7. The 
second intends to discourage these actions increasing the chance of being frustrated, the 
players apprehended and imprisoned, and penalties applied. In short, by raising their 
costs and reducing their benefits. The security industry focuses mainly on this second 
activity. This activity can be further broken down into active measures to abate the 
source of threat, targeting terrorist and crime organisations to reduce their operational 
capability; and protective or defensive measures aimed at strengthening the potential 
targets, increasing the difficulty to strike them with success. Once again, the security 
industry concentrates mainly in providing means for the second type of activity.  
 
                                                 
5  See the introduction of the EU Commission (2009) document Towards a more secure society and 
increased industrial competitiveness. Security Research Projects under the 7
th Framework Program for 
Research. 
6  The CEN BT/WG 161 on Protection and Security of the Citizen adopted the following definition in 
January 2005: “Security is the condition (perceived or confirmed) of an individual, a community, and 
organisation, a societal institution, a state, and their assets (such as goods, infrastructure), to be 
protected against danger or threats such as criminal activity, terrorism or other deliberate or hostile acts, 
disasters (natural and man-made)”. Dr. Alois J. Sieber (Institute for the Protection and Security of the 
Citizen - IPSC) presentation on Standards for Security and Protection of the Citizen in the Security 
Research Conference, Ankara, April 2008.  
7   For example, soft measures addressing causes that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities, 
social exclusion, poor social cohesion, sense of grievance and injustice, lack of opportunities, or 
discrimination. They can also challenge the ideologies (battle of ideas) that extremists believe can 
justify violence.   7
Active measures against terrorism and organised crime aim at disabling their 
infrastructure and networks, controlling their accesses to sensitive knowledge and 
material
8, discouraging people’s involvement in these organisations and weakening 
their support and sponsors. These organisations operate nowadays in a highly efficient 
manner on trans-national networks (Europol, 2008, 2009). This is facilitated by the low 
cost of transport, transfer of money and communication which permits their operation in 
a mixed way, based on local players supported financially and logistically by their 
international counterparts. Therefore, the detection and disruption of the flow of 
persons, funds and illegal goods within these networks is one good method to reduce 
their capability, in particular when crossing borders. 
 
These groups have fundamental advantages to act with a small level of risk due to the 
asymmetry of information they enjoy and the ease with which they can select 
opportunity targets. This behaviour, perceived from the outside as random, would force 
large and expensive investments to assure a sufficiently wide protection level. Since this 
approach is economically unaffordable, societies have to concentrate on the protection 
of key societal assets, networks, services and facilities, such as transport, health, energy, 
water, production of dangerous goods, information and communication, finance, food or 
government, usually known as critical infrastructures. A successful attack on any of 
them could create important disruptions to the entire society and generate large losses. 
 
These groups may be wealthy enough to stand up to small armies, and their attacks can 
take a form similar to that of guerrilla or military action, using weapons such as mortars, 
                                                 
8   For example access to weapons, explosive precursors, chemical or biological agents. Therefore, 
preventive measures are needed to safeguard these assets and avoid their steal.     8
RPG guns, MANPADS
9 or even CBRNE
10 devices against high pay off targets, that 
may result in mass casualties or widespread damage. Additionally, terrorists could act 
as proxy of certain states or may have foreign logistics bases. Countering these groups 
may require joint actions of law enforcement units and armed forces such as hostage 
recovery, maritime counter-terrorism, bomb disposal, renegade aircraft interception, and 
the prosecution of terrorists up to their havens in host countries. Moreover, security 
incidents with far reaching consequences may require the additional logistical 
capabilities of the Armed Forces. Therefore, areas exist where the separation of security 
and defence issues becomes complex, making the task of qualifying their suppliers 
challenging. 
 
Public health may be a target of terrorism or organised crime as another means to 
achieve desired goals
11. Chemical or biological agents can be dispersed in the air or 
water, infecting thousands of people, contaminating soils, buildings and transport assets, 
destroying agriculture, infecting animal and plant populations, and affecting food and 
feed at any stage in the supply chain. Safeguarding the society from this risk is a major 
challenge, where early detection systems and the pharmaceutical industry can provide 
some solutions. 
  
Insurance companies play a relevant role in the security field. They facilitate the buying 
of insurance against potential damages, providing financial support for incident 
recovery. They estimate the risks and consequences of undesired events and define the 
payable amount (premium) to cover the economic losses of insecurity. They can 
                                                 
9   Man Portable Air Defence System. 
10  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive. 
11 The chemical attack to Tokyo subway in 1996 and the anthrax attack in the USA after 9/11 raise 
concerns about this sort of actions.   9
stimulate security investment providing discounts to homeowners, businesses and other 
organisations who invest in cost-effective loss-mitigation measures. Therefore, they 
may have a considerable influence in standardising security procedures, solutions, and 
equipment
12. However, since insurance companies are not true solution providers in 
reducing or eliminating risk, they should be considered a less relevant research area.  
  
MAIN TYPES OF SECURITY INDUSTRIES 
 
Due to the high diversity of threats, technologies and security solutions, this sector is 
composed of companies of a very varied nature, who sometimes only share as a 
unifying nexus the term security. Products and services generated include locks and 
safes, fire and burglar alarms, electronic access control systems, electronic surveillance 
equipment, armoured and protected vehicles, guard equipment and garments, security 
fencing, and security consulting. In some cases products have a very small supply chain, 
while in others they may require the integration of components from a large supply 
chain such as border and maritime surveillance systems. Sometimes production is very 
large and standardised such as in-motion detectors, whilst in others, it is more 
handcrafted and tailored to satisfy specific end customer demands such as a building 
intrusion detection systems. Sometimes products are sold directly to the customer, 
whilst in others, distributors, value added resellers and systems integration plays a key 
role in the supply chain. The technologies used in these products is varied and includes 
amongst others construction, automotive, aerospace, textiles and garments, ballistics, 
electronics, and information and communications systems. Usually these products and 
services are not only applicable to security, but also to other activities. For example, 
                                                 
12  The European insurance companies still play in this area a low role. See page 155 of Wharton (2005).   10
identity cards may be used for police identification but also to exert the right to vote. 
Video cameras may be used for surveillance but also for leisure. Intermediate products 
tend to have this dual role that increases up the supply chain, where it might even occur 
that a company ignores the fact that its product is integrated and sold in the security 
market. This varied nature increases the difficulty of the analysis. 
 
Measures and means to counter terrorism and organised crime are conditioned to a large 
extent by the behaviour and technological status of these groups. Their limited resources 
and the need to function undetected, dictates that they focus on inexpensive and easy to 
access technologies, in sharp contrast with the technologies that States can afford. Risks 
are only ever taken in limited cases for high pay off weapons. Yet these groups have 
shown competent capability in developing tactics and using technology in quite 
innovative ways to overcome deployed measures and achieve their goals. For example 
drug trafficking gangs have been able to use submarines to transport their illegal 
products, such as the one captured by the Mexican Police July 16, 2008 as reported by 
CBS News. The dynamic behaviour creates a competition between State measures and 
countermeasures of these groups that may bring about research and development of new 
security equipment and raise society expenditure, however not always with a clear 
outcome in terms of increased security.  
 
Often the provision of security is based on non-material solutions or the development of 
redundancies to increase resilience, but in other cases, the security tasks or functions 
can be largely improved with the goods and services provided by the industry. In the 
next paragraph, the more relevant will be commented grouped around the main 




Preparedness addresses the tasks related to the planning, equipping, training, and 
rehearsing of resources and means needed to prevent, avoid or undergo security 
incidents such as the stockpiling of drugs, vaccines, or antidotes for facing a CBRN 
attack.  
 
Preparedness requires special knowledge for analysing threats and vulnerabilities, 
assessing risk, developing contingency and resilience plans and procedures, assessing 
the required investments, performing feasibility studies of best methods to deal with 
insecurity or managing the acquisition of security solutions. These highly skilled 
activities are often outsourced to small consultancy companies and in other cases to 
departments of large companies specialised in this kind of technical assistance. 
 
Preparedness also requires training and rehearsal systems, particularly for first 
responders and decision makers. This task is performed by companies specialised in 
training that may integrate software training tools. The computer industry may also 
develop systems to artificially simulate, in an inexpensive way, the incident scenario 
allowing stakeholders to rehearse the different responses, evaluate their outcome, and 
increase their capability to appropriately manage the situation. This seems to be a very 
promising market for the near future. 
 
Early warning and awareness 
   12
Since terrorists and participants in organised crime conceal their activities, surveillance 
is necessary to detect, identify and recognise traces of suspicious activities in order to 
activate potential countermeasures able to frustrate any impending terrorist or criminal 
action. For example, the identification of organised crime bank accounts facilitates the 
detection of money laundering and may be used to block funds in support of illegal 
activities. Other examples are the discovery of illegal weapons hidden in baggage, the 
identification of a person claimed by justice on a border crossing, or the interception of 
phone and e-mail communications.  
 
Early warning includes a plethora of surveillance equipments able to explore and record 
the full electromagnetic spectrum to identify precursor signals that can announce a 
security incident. This includes different types of sensors and components able to gather 
these signals extract meaningful information and transmit and depict it to the surveyor, 
reducing his or her workload. Sensors can be integrated into a network, increasing their 
reliability and facilitating the detection of anomalies that may announce a potential 
threat. The electronics, communications, computer and software industries are the main 
providers of equipment for early warning and surveillance. 
 
Building and facilities protection 
 
Surveillance equipment is used mainly in the protection of buildings and facilities. It is 
complemented with access control systems able to automatically identify and authorise 
access. CCTV is the most universal equipment for surveillance. Cameras usually 
operate in the visual spectrum, but image intensifiers or thermal cameras may be used 
under poor visual conditions. Most advanced cameras are able to process the images   13
being able to classify and distinguish the presence of people on the scene, monitor their 
behaviour, identify people based on their biometric features
13 and raise a warning if 
deemed suspicious. Many of the devices used to detect intrusion are able to sense 
sound, microwaves, ultrasounds, or vibrations. More simple detectors are able to notice 
doors or windows opening or breaking. Building protection may be complemented with 
fire detectors and automatic extinguishing systems. 
 
Access control is based on credentials usually stored in magnetic or smart cards able to 
be read by computer. Most advanced systems use biometric features to verify that the 




Border protection requires specific surveillance equipment to detect illegal entry in 
unregulated borders, as well as identification and verification of identity and access 
rights at entry points. Radars, day and night cameras and other long range sensors can 
be used to detect vehicles, persons and small boats attempting to illegally cross the 
border. Whilst sensors can be located at specific fixed locations, sometimes they have to 
be installed on mobile platforms such as vehicles, ships, airplanes or even satellites to 
assure a reasonable and affordable coverage of large border perimeters. The production 
of these complex systems requires platform builders and system integrators in addition 
to the sensor supplier. 
 
                                                 
13 These equipments use the physiological characteristics of the face, hand geometry, fingerprint, eye 
retina, ear shape, or behaviour, such as voice or signature, using digital scanning and pattern 
recognition techniques for identification purposes.   14
Identification on borders (and other places) is based on personal identity cards, 
passports or visas. While this information was in the past stored on paper with adequate 
counterfeit protection –like specific paper and printing procedures such as holograms–, 
they are evolving today into new documents where the identity information, including 
biometric features, is encrypted and stored in the integrated circuit of a smart card able 
to be read and processed directly by a computer system, largely reducing the 
opportunity of identity fraud. Car-plate readers can be used for automatic vehicle 
identification. 
 
Non-intrusive inspection systems are also needed to detect weapons, explosives and 
drugs under clothes and personal belongings. They are used in transportation hubs like 
airports or train stations, but more intensively on borders. They include metal detectors, 




Finally control of merchandise is needed to avoid traffic of dangerous or forbidden 
material and smuggling of goods. Container seals and cargo manifest on paper are the 
traditional method in assuring the integrity of containers. These systems are today 
evolving into electronic seals and electronic cargo manifest documents that can be 
managed in a more agile way with the support of computers. Sensor equipment such as 
gamma ray and neutron detectors can be used to detect nuclear or radiological materiel, 
and high power X-ray and pulsed fast neutron can be used to obtain a radiography of the 
interior of the container helping to improve the customs inspection process. 
   15
The main challenge of inspection systems is an adequate level of efficiency, avoiding 
the entry of illegal material while maintaining a free (or nearly free) flow of legitimate 
travel and commerce with a reduced impact on trade, in terms of costs, delays or 
reduced flow. This is a relevant need in a globalised world where a considerable 
increase in personal and material flow is expected. 
 
This requires a short timeframe, a low failure rate in terms of false positives and 
negatives, and a minimum amount of resources that today technology is not always able 
to provide. Therefore, this area is subject to intense research in the USA and the EU in 
order to find effective solutions that increase the number of inspections, since it is 
estimated that the contents of less than 2% of all containers are checked (Van der Voort, 
2002). Electronic credentials and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) combined with 
large databases and computer systems, seems to be a promising solution. However, 




Data gathering and analysis regarding the activities of terrorism and organised crime is 
crucial in order to disable these groups before they can carry out their planned actions. 
The appropriate combination of disparate and initially unrelated evidence with 
historically recorded data may facilitate the generation of intelligence regarding 
members, networks, intentions and means of operation of these groups. 
 
When an act of terrorism or some sort of criminal action is carried out, it is fundamental 
to investigate the scene where the event has occurred, to find and collect evidence. The   16
evidence can be analysed in forensic laboratories, using highly specialised instruments 
provided by the industry such as fingerprints or DNA to extract relevant information. 
This information may facilitate the reconstruction of the event and the identification of 
the perpetrators, helping to imprison and condemn criminals and prevent further attacks. 
  
The investigation process can be improved through the use of large database computer 
systems where evidence can be compared with stored information regarding face, 
fingerprint, DNA, name, judicial records and other relevant data. Online access to this 
system from mobile terminals may be very useful when temporary spot controls are 
placed in streets, crossroads or stations where people have to cross to arrive to their 
destination. Industry can support this activity supplying high performance computers 
and specific algorithms such as pattern recognition, data mining and natural language 
processing to analyse information, validate hypothesis and derive knowledge.  
 
Early warning of natural and man-made disasters 
 
Natural and man-made disasters can be pre-warned, helping to respond quickly and 
avoid greater damages. Early warnings include weather forecasting systems, fire 
detection systems (in particular forest fires) and flooding detectors through the real-time 
measure of water levels in rivers and watersheds. Seismic sensors can detect 
earthquakes, however predictive methods to anticipate them is still an immature science.  
 
The effectiveness of some of the solutions for early warning and intelligence are largely 
conditioned to the use of common standards (e.g., identity cards, containers seals, etc.) 
and the capability to interoperate and exchange or share information between the   17
different stakeholders responsible for security, in particular State agencies of Member 
States, in order to easily identify any kind of anomaly that may trigger the appropriate 
measure to curb the potential risk
14. 
 
Protection / Response 
 
The protection means includes different countermeasures to deter, deny, frustrate, or 
cope with mentioned threats. Countermeasures can be classified as passive or active. 
The main passive countermeasures include architectural barriers and building 
strengthening, personal or vehicle protection against light and non-conventional 
(CBRN) weapons, personal protection equipment for first responders, and other security 
measures integrated in the system design. Active countermeasures includes the use of 
weapons and vehicles to capture and prosecute outlaws, equipment to protect own 
communications to avoid interferences and espionage and to disrupt communications 
used by these groups (e.g., remote activation of explosives), and deactivation of 
improvised explosive devices.  
 
Particularly relevant is the provision of guarding services, a very important part of the 
security industry that employs a large number of persons (higher than 1,700,000 
according to CoESS (2008). 
 
Protection in the cyberspace 
 
                                                 
14 Such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the VISA information System (VIS), or 
EURODAC for asylum request control.   18
Cyber crime can be defined as criminal acts committed using electronic communication 
networks and information systems or against such networks and services
15. This is one 
of the areas where illegal organisations can accrue important benefits if they access or 
modify key information; or block critical information systems using malicious software 
(malware) such as virus, spyware, worms or trojans. This problem could be particularly 
serious if they attack systems that support critical infrastructures, since such attacks can 
degrade or even disrupt the essential services they provide. The magnitude and losses of 
cyber attack is little known since many companies do not report security breaches on the 
basis of a potential loss of customer confidence. But a report in the Financial Times of 
May 5, 2006 estimated the cost in the UK to be around 10£ bn. 
 
Identity theft is one of the ways to steal
16, modify or delete high value information, or to 
execute unauthorised operations such as the transfer of funds (financial fraud) in 
electronic commerce and banking systems. Techniques for obtaining passwords and 
credit card details include phishing where this sensitive information can be obtained by 
masquerading as a trustworthy person or web site.  
 
Cybercrime tries to cause damage to electronic networks attacking their information 
systems, blocking their services, or hacking. It uses advanced techniques to decipher 
computer and communication codes to obtain passwords and to gain computer access in 
order to damage key system functions. The main purpose of these actions is usually 
extortion. Cybercrime may also include the publication of illegal content via electronic 
media such as sexual abuse of children or incitement to terrorism. 
                                                 
15  Communication from the Commission “Towards a general policy in fight against cyber crime” COM 
(2007) 267 final. 
16  For example, digitalized films can be stolen and counterfeited and sold in piracy markets lowering the 
expected income of companies and causing large losses.   19
 
The computer software industry offers a wide range of solutions and services to assure 
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and systems such as: high assurance 
software development methodologies to avoid weak points, means of user identification 
and authentication including biometrics, strong encryption systems to assure secure 
information exchange, log systems and analysis tools for auditing purposes in order to 
detect intrusion and attacks, filters to avoid spam messages, programs to detect viruses, 
and redundant systems and back up tools to easily recover data and systems. Their 
ultimate objective is that the customer enjoys a trusted on-line environment. The 
growing internet market has massively stimulated the demand for these types of 
products and services. The Gartner company estimated the worldwide revenues of the 





Crisis management and emergency services require capabilities to cope with and 
mitigate the effects of a successful terrorist or criminal attack, or a natural or man made 
disaster, and avoid its propagation.  
 
Means to cope with personal damages include first responders equipment such as search 
equipment for finding survivors between ruins, first aids, and evacuation means to 
secure areas or hospitals, sometimes using specialised vehicles such as ambulances. In 
the case of a large attack or disaster, additional means are needed for evacuating mass 
casualties and fatalities and administering relief to survivors providing energy, food,   20
medical care or water supply. Victims may also need psychological aid services to 
overcome the trauma caused by the incident. 
 
Means to cope with material damages include fire-fighting equipment, emergency 
demolitions, deactivation of unexploded devices, and emergency repair of buildings or 
public works. It may also require surveillance of the disaster area to avoid looting, theft 
or vandalism. 
 
A CBRN attack requires that first responders wear specialised equipment and vehicles 
are protected against these agents. The identification of the agent is essential in 
providing appropriate relief and reducing health damages. It may include the extensive 
use of medication and vaccination of the targeted population. Specialised equipment is 
also needed to decontaminate people, material, buildings, facilities or even geographic 
areas depending on the type of attack and the agent used.  
  
Particularly relevant are the means needed to gather and share information about the 
overall situation, coordinate available resources (including volunteers), and evaluate 
how and with what effect these resources are being applied. These systems, popularly 
known as Command and Control systems, are based on a robust network of information 
and communications systems able to manage the situation. These systems require 
deployment capabilities in the area of the incident. The communications capabilities – 
that may include in some cases satellites– facilitate the sharing and distribution of 
timely and accurate information to the various response teams and the citizens, keeping 
them informed about the damage extent, continuing threats and actions to take. These 
capabilities may greatly speed up the response time and action to save life, limb and   21
property and curtail economic and environmental damage, reducing the magnitude of 
losses and avoiding propagation via indirect effects; in short, to improve the efficiency 
of the response. These system are including specialised software tools to improve 
situation awareness such as precise location of personnel and assets, information fusion, 
damage assessment, predictive tools of the evolving situation to anticipate impending 
threats, and decision support aids. 
 
While the requirements of these systems are rather different than the defence industry, it 
is probably this industry, the more prepared to integrate the large number of 
sophisticated hardware, software and communication components that are needed to 
achieve such capability. Again, interoperability of communications, through appropriate 
use of standards, is an essential requirement to achieve a successful system when many 




A fundamental item of a research agenda should be the collection of enough 
quantitative and qualitative information to obtain a complete, accurate and reliable 
picture of this economic sector from which knowledge can be derived. 
 
Here different problems appear. National security industry associations that can provide 
a wealth of information on the sector do not always exist. On the contrary, we find 
associations that only cover limited areas such as fire protection, ICT-Security or 
Security Services. Others name themselves as Security and Defence associations, but do 
not distinguish in which sector each company operates. In addition many industries and   22
conglomerates operate in more sectors than security, the latter not being its core 
business. Therefore, they may not classify themselves as security industry. All these 
problems complicate the data gathering process. The main identified information 
sources are: 
 
•  Published texts. There is a short list of publications regarding the European Security 
Industry and few papers exist in open literature that are directly related to this 
research. The EU research project STACATTO has carried out some studies from 
the supply chain and research and development point of view, but they are not a true 
economic analysis of the sector. ECORYS performed a competitive study of the 
sector in 2009 for DG Enterprise and Industry. IDC EMEA has also performed a 
study of the European network and information security market in the same year for 
DG Information Society and Media. Specialised consultancy companies, like Frost 
and Sullivan, publish written reports regarding this sector, but they are mainly 
focused on market opportunity analysis for assessing investors. These non-free 
reports, therefore, may be subject to (optimistic) biasing and should be read with 
caution.  
 
Specialised magazines, exhibition catalogues and directories in the field seem to be 
a good source of information on enterprises and products. However, these 
documents focus mainly on marketing issues and in supporting the search for 
partners, rather than providing a complete and objective profile. Independent 
technical reports on security technologies and products and official documents on 
public security programs and their budgets provide interesting insights into the 
sector. These raw sources of information, however, require considerable analysis.   23
 
•  Statistical information. Eurostat can be a source of information for analysing this 
economic sector. The NACE
17 code of Statistical Classification of Economic 
Activities has reserved the code 80 for security and investigation activities, while 
the class 84.24 is reserved for Public order and Safety activities. With these codes 
some statistical information from the EU and Member States security sector related 
to expenditure, outputs, imports and exports could be obtained. However, security 
equipment is embedded in codes that also include other items. Nonetheless, the 
availability of this information is not always guaranteed. 
 
•  General industrial European databases. These databases can provide main 
economic values of security companies. Information could also be available on 
industrial and professional associations related to the different types of security 
industries. However, these reports are not always available or published on an 
annual basis. 
 
•  Company information. Another data source is the information disclosed by 
companies. The information contained on their websites provides accurate 
information relating to their products, marketing strategies and economic indicators. 
Yet only large companies publish a complete web page. Complementary 
information could be obtained through the analysis of the response to written 
questionnaires sent to companies; however this kind of approach tends to yield a 
very low and incomplete response level (in the range of 5%-30%), reducing the 
                                                 
17  Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes.   24
chance of obtaining a significant amount of useful information. Interviews can 
partially solve these problems. However, this requires considerable resources. 
 
It is obvious that the depth and quality of any research depends greatly on the size, 
accuracy and reliability of the information collected. Therefore, the collection of the 
best available information is a critical issue. Besides, drawing conclusions will require 
the examination of the completeness and reliability of information collected. An initial 
list of information sources may be found at the end of the paper. 
 
MAPPING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY INDUSTRY 
  
The identification of industrial capabilities in the different market segments and the 
geographic distribution should be another relevant point of the agenda. Market 
segments can be derived from the different kind of security services and products, and 
their analysis could help to identify more precisely potential gaps. For example, the 
strong presence of foreign companies, such as USA subsidiaries, may indicate that the 
European security industry is not performing as well as expected. 
 
The analysis should take into account capabilities in the areas of research, development, 
manufacturing and operational support. Special emphasis should be placed on 
technologies used, and the relevant role that information and communications 
technologies seems to play in this market.  
 
The mapping process should be completed trying to obtain relevant data from the 
industry in order to ascertain a clearer image of the sector. Basic values to consider   25
include net sales, employees and profits. Other useful values could be: export sales, 
R&D expenditure, percentage of activity in the security field, market capitalisation or 
added value. Since the high number of companies in the sector might impede a 
comprehensive analysis, this activity should concentrate on major and leading 
stakeholders as their main features may provide a better clue of the principal patterns of 
the sector. 
 
The analysis should also study the supply chain of security products, its current 
complexity, and the role that small and medium enterprises (SME) play. This analysis 
should be complemented assessing the degree of diversification in the industry and the 
role of security in their core business. This will aid in the identification of strong 
backward and forward links with other economic sectors of the economy.  
 
One area to survey is the identification of companies with a large market share, since it 
may create dominant positions that could impact on market performance. Obtaining 
concentration ratios would be quite useful, yet it may not be easy to obtain enough 
quantitative information to measure this value. The reasons behind such market 
concentration such as large capital requirements and economies of scale of mass 
production should be evaluated as well.  
  
The size of the sector in each EU Member State as well as the overall size, is relevant 
information to collect. Differences between countries that may appear, including those 
related to technological capabilities, should be considered. An attempt to compare 
sectors on each side of the Atlantic, should enough information be collected, could 
highlight remarkable similarities and differences. In figure 2 an initial distribution can   26
be seen, where it is possible to see that France, United Kingdom and Germany have the 




Measuring the output of the sector in economic terms appears to be difficult. The OECD 
report estimated the worldwide security industry turnover to be between 100 and 120 
billion $ in 2004. The values for the three main European economies given were: 
Germany 4 billion, UK 3 billion and France 3 billion. The Homeland Security Research 
Corporation estimated worldwide expenditures in security for 2004 at 157 billion $ of 
which 34.2 billion corresponded to Europe. Civitas group estimated worldwide 
expenditure at 55 billion $ for 2006 of which 13 billion corresponded to Europe. 
Unfortunately, the methodologies used to estimate these values are not described, but 
such large differences suggest that sector boundaries of each estimate are different, or 
methods are probably rather inaccurate. Efforts to improve accuracy, while not easy, are 
certainly needed. Aggregation of values could be carried out based on the turnover of 
the largest companies. However, since some industries are highly diversified 
conglomerates and their turnover on security is not always known (or is considered 
commercially confidential), this value could be very imprecise.  
 
DEMAND ANALYSIS  
 
A research agenda shall include an analysis of the demand. The different stakeholders 
that request security –namely Public Administration, corporations and individual 
consumers– should be analysed in detail to discover the main drivers that shape their 
purchasing behaviour. Main stakeholders are:   27
 
•  Individual consumers. These consumers purchase security to protect their 
households and other main assets such as vehicles, and earnings (through bank 
accounts and deposits). Household protection is usually based on relatively 
inexpensive low technology products such as locks and safes. People with higher 
acquisition power install intrusion equipment systems wired to a small alarm centre 
that connects, through a communications line, to a central alarm system operated by 
a guarding company. These systems are based on widely available and 
competitively priced standard off-the-shelf products. 
 
•  Private agents (organisations and companies). These agents buy security to protect 
their businesses and prevent any economic loss due to the disruption created by a 
security incident. They develop business continuity and security plans and purchase 
the means needed to implement them, mainly early warning systems, and access 
control systems. Security services demand includes protection of assets (e.g. 
transport of funds) and investigation services. Investment is more common in large 
corporations who usually have a Security Officer. Due to its nature, the banking 
sector and air transport have been the main investors in this field. Here security 
solutions are usually more tailored to user needs. 
 
Of particular relevance are the organisations that own or operate critical 
infrastructures. Since the disruption of their services can have severe social and 
economic consequences, these organizations invest more resources in security. Yet 
considerations of efficiency can make these organizations invest below what is   28
desirable from the social point of view and regulations could be needed to fix a 
minimum amount of security they have to provide. 
 
•  The Public Administration. The third relevant customer is the Public 
Administration. It has a true key role in safeguarding society from security threats 
and thus is the main consumer of security products and services. Yet, its role does 
not circumscribe to be a mere customer that sets the demand of many security 
products and services of government agencies involved in the direct protection the 
citizens, but also in the setting up of public policies, laws, regulations that specify 
legal security obligations of firms and individuals and features and performance of 
security goods and services (e.g. privacy rights). These regulations may have a 
significant impact on the economy in terms of required investments, trade frictional 
cost, or welfare losses. In addition, the Public Administration may stimulate security 
investment providing aids and subsidies, or act as a locomotive in the development 
of new solutions through the financing of research and large acquisitions. This role 
greatly influences demand and supply in this sector, as well as the behaviour of 
private agents. Main purchasers are law enforcement, civil protection and 
emergency organizations. They may operate at local, regional, national, European or 
even supranational level. 
 
The analysis of the demand should identify the preferred goods and services of each 
type of customer and the reasons behind it, such as risk perception, loss expectation, 
risk aversion and the investment required to gain a feeling of confidence or peace of   29
mind
18 as well as other related factors with influence in the purchasing decision such as 




Table 1 records public order and safety expenditures for European countries. This value 
corresponds to 0.5% of GDP of the EU-25 for 2007; 0.4 for intermediate consumption 
and only 0.1 for gross capital formation. It includes expenditures in police services, fire 
protection, courts of justice, and prisons. This value is 25% smaller when compared 
with the defence sector. Once again, we see that the four main consumers are the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy. The table shows a moderate growth rate similar 
to defence expenditures. However, these values could only be considered an estimate of 
demand size, because these numbers also reflect purchases of goods and services not 
related to this market (e.g. fuel). Furthermore, it does not consider the expenses of 
private agents as companies and individuals. Civitas Group estimated this value around 
43% of government expenditures. An approximation to this value so far seems 
achievable only through indirect methods such as the one mentioned in Hobijn (2002). 
 
To forecast the future of security demand is even more difficult, since it depends on 
many factors previously mentioned. These factors are difficult to measure accurately, 
and their true influence on demand is unclear. Yet a large security incident in the world 
or a general economic crisis may have a more direct impact on security investment. 
Growing rates have been given in some documents, but they seem a futile theoretical 
exercise. For example, the OECD (2004) report estimated a growing rate of 7-8% 
                                                 
18 This value depends on the frequency and the type of incidents, the range of possible targets, the 
sophistication of the attack method and the countermeasure complexity. This perception is often based 
on cognitive experience of the past rather than estimates of probability of future events.   30
annually a truly healthy value that is coherent with the previous table, but only for 2004. 
The Homeland Security Research Corporation estimated a steeper trend for reaching an 
expenditure of around 178 billion $ in 2015, a value that means an approximate yearly 
growth rate of 15% for Europe. Frost and Sullivan (2005) estimates this value for 
Europe at 10% annually over the coming years. These values seem too high, when 
compared with the growth rate of the previous table, the latter values possibly 
suggesting a higher inertia to raise investment even in the presence of large attacks such 
as the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings. 
 
Therefore a more accurate measure of the demand and the driving force of investments 
in security are a relevant research issue. For example, globalisation is increasing the 
flow of persons due to immigration or tourism, and the flow of merchandise, or e-
commerce on the internet. Such growth is increasing terrorism and organised crime 
opportunities and the threat level. These facts press on a large demand of products and 
services, in terms of quantity and better quality, to cope with this higher risk that 
partially explains the protracted growth of the market.  
 
Another question to evaluate is the potential fragmentation of this market in Europe –as 
EOS(2009) states–, in particularly in the field of Public Procurement. Such a 
fragmented market may hinder the achievement of economies of scale and may impede 
an adequate allocation of research and procurement resources that may be suboptimal 
due to duplication of programmes, especially when their complexity recommends a 
more cooperative approach and the funding of a single project.  
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The demand for security in other areas of the world that may potentially be supplied by 
the European Security industry should be a relevant area of study. Customers such as 
China, India and Brazil, as they progress will increase their security spending, whilst 
they do not always have enough proficiency to indigenously produce the security 
equipment. An indicator could be the demerged information of the balance of payments 
in relation to security products and services sales. Available information from Eurostat 
could facilitate its measure. Yet, these sales might be merged within broader accounts 
such as electronic equipment. Conversely, imports of security and intermediate products 
should also be assessed in terms of higher competition and potential bottlenecks for 




Any research agenda should evaluate the performance of the market. This is a complex 
task due to the variety of industries in this economic sector and the availability of 
sufficient information to perform the analysis. Such analysis, even based on qualitative 
information, when quantitative data is not available, is required when searching for 
policies that may enhance this sector. 
 
Performance analysis tries to evaluate if industry: is efficient at allocating resources; is 
able to exploit economies of scale, scope, and learning; and shows a dynamic trend to 
provide innovative high value security products and services at the lowest cost, while 
adequately remunerating their shareholders. Since competition stimulates a better 
allocation of resources one of the main areas of research in performance analysis is the 
analysis of market structure and conduct of the industry as long as they assure, over the   32
long run, a workable competition where efficient firms are rewarded and inefficient 
ones are punished. If this dynamic is present, the market will be driven to greater 
efficiency over time to the maximum benefit of customers. The analysis should be made 
jointly examining basic market conditions and government policies as both provide the 
general framework to the industry. 
 
This structure, conduct and performance model for performing industrial analyses was 
pioneered by Bain (1956). The model has been further reviewed and refined by many 
authors such as Scherer and Ross (1990) or Martin (1993). This theoretical framework 
is still a rich source of guidance for industrial analyses of many economic sectors 




Basic market conditions analyses questions related to demand, such as price elasticity, 
substitutes, market growth, demand cyclicality, and purchasing methods; as well as 
issues related to supply such as cost structures, inputs, technology, and information. 
These conditions have influence on the structure of the industry and the attractiveness of 




The number and size distribution of buyers and sellers in the market, entry conditions, 
product differentiation, vertical integration, diversification, and imports are elements of 
the market structure with influence in the degree of competition in the market and the   33
strategic behaviour of the industry. For example, economies or large scale production or 




Market conduct assesses the actual behaviour of firms with regards to pricing, product 
strategy, advertising, research and innovation, and other tactics to maximize profits. If 
market concentration is low, decisions are made more independently, but when 
concentration is high, competitors’ behaviour will have a strong influence in company 
behaviour and industry will be more tempted to shape the market to its own benefit. In 




As has been noted, market performance is the ultimate arbiter on how well market 
forces are doing. The analysis should evaluate if market incentives are appropriate to 
reach a good performance and there are some restraints of current structure and conduct 
that degrade market efficiency to satisfy society needs in security. Of particular 
relevance is the dynamic performance that results in product and services with improved 
performance and lower cost. Performance can be assessed through some indicators like 
product quality, allocative and productive efficiency, equity value and profitability, etc. 
 
Government policy 
   34
Finally, government policy has a strong influence on the sector. First, it fixes 
competition policy and assures a level playing field. Second, it is an important supporter 
of market performance providing subsidies and other incentives to finance research, 
development and innovation. Third, it is the largest purchaser of goods and services 
(e.g., e-passports) playing a key role in market growth. Fourth, it fixes minimum 
security requirements for private business through laws and regulations strongly 
influencing demand. Fifth, it also plays a key role in the development of standards and 




This paper has presented a research agenda for improving what is known about the 
security sector in the European Union. It has drawn a first description of the sector, the 
main types of goods and services offered and some of the relevant technologies used. It 
has described methods for data collection, the mapping of industrial capabilities, 
demand analysis and performance analysis. The main hurdles that any agenda has to 
overcome in order to achieve the desired goal have also been highlighted. Poor and 
sparse information are noted as the main obstacle in reaching reliable conclusions. 
 
The implementation of the agenda would provide relevant findings that will help to 
review initial assumptions and hypotheses about this industry, and reveal new research 
paths. It may depict a clearer image facilitating a better judgement to those attempting 
to define policies and plans aimed at improving this relevant economic sector for the 
security of Europe and its citizens. 
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Figure 2. Number of European companies working in the security sector. 
Source: European Security Directory 2009 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Austria 779.1  839.3 837.2 922.3 912.6 922.8  945.1
Belgium 715.6  834.0 873.1 760.5 794.5 804.6  821.8
Denmark 531.6  549.1 581.6 625.6 674.8 698.3  744.6
Finland 650.0  603.0 633.0 613.0 637.0 635.0  672.0
France 4,362.0  4,973.0 5,447.0 5,775.0 5,956.0 5,952.0  6,178.0
Germany 9,520.0  10,060.0 9,860.0 10,520.0 10,640.0 11,350.0  12,100.0
Greece 189.0  195.0 222.0 263.0 267.0 288.0 406.0
Ireland 510.4  579.5 598.7 635.9 696.0 872.2  1,023.5  39
Italy 3,868.0  5,088.0 5,371.0 5,239.0 5,451.0 5,403.0  5,710.0
Luxembourg 49.7  61.5 79.1 84.6 89.9 85.8  80.1
Netherlands 2,657.0  3,169.0 3,336.0 3,490.0 3,507.0 3,951.0  4,281.0
Portugal 384.5  348.3 412.4 390.9 432.4 429.4  449.4
Spain 2,529.0  2,922.0 3,119.0 3,591.0 3,794.0 4,063.0  4,702.0
Sweden 1,212.5  1,356.6 1,348.0 1,281.0 1,364.8 1,510.5  1,552.7
United Kingdom  15,393.9  17,230.5 17,032.1 19,635.8 20,786.7 21,121.3 21,997.8
EU-15 43,352.3  48,808.8 49,750.2 53,827.6 56,003.7 58,086.9 61,664.0
Bulgaria 136.5  46.5 168.3 176.1 184.6 161.4  286.0
Cyprus 29.0  33.4 36.0 35.7 34.4 39.2  44.1
Czech Republic  365.4  500.1 480.2 525.8 527.3 626.6 674.4
Estonia 62.9  75.4 79.3 66.6 88.1 106.7  131.0
Hungary 277.0  410.9 346.0 349.9 361.2 349.4  361.8
Latvia 45.6  43.5 44.8 54.3 112.9 172.3  221.8
Lithuania 49.0  60.3 68.4 79.8 89.3 112.9  145.9
Malta 14.5  13.5 15.2 13.9 13.1 12.6  12.4
Poland -  845.4 983.0 1,064.7 1,428.6 1,653.8  1,960.0
Romania -  279.3 389.6 382.5 670.8 686.6  469.4
Slovakia 256.1  250.1 186.5 269.1 280.7 346.0  368.3
Slovenia 114.4  119.5 126.9 132.9 126.3 150.0  179.6
EU-12 1,350.4  2,677.9 2,924.2 3,151.3 3,917.3 4,417.5  4,854.7
EU-27 44,702.7  51,486.7 52,674.4 56,978.9 59,921.0 62,504.4 66,518.7
Growth rate    15.2% 2.3% 8.2% 5.2% 4.3%  6.4%
Table 1. Government expenditures in Public order and safety in M€ (2003-2007) 
Source: EUROSTAT (series: General Government expenditure function, Classification of the 
functions of government: 3 Public Order and safety, National accounts indicators: P2 Intermediate 
consumption + P5 gross capital formation)  
 
 
Name Organisation  Web  address  Information 











ESRIF European  Security Research 
Information Forum 
www.esrif.eu Security  research 
EOS  European Organisation for Security  www.eos-eu.com Security 
stakeholders. 
ESD  European Security Directory  www.esd-partners.com European  Security 
industry. 





STACCATO  Stakeholders Platform for Supply 
chain Mapping, Market Condition 










 Europe  infoway  www.security-europe.info Security, safety 
and fire directory 
COESS Confederation  of European Security 
Services 
http://coess.org/about.htm Providers  of 
protection services 
(guards) 




EURALARM  Association of European  http://www.euralarm.org  Installer of fire   40
manufacturers and installers of fire 
and security systems. 
and security alarm 
systems mainly 
for private agents. 
ENISA  European Network and Information 
Security Agency 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu Security  of 
networks and 
information. 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
www.oecd.org World  economic 
trends. 
IMF  International Monetary Fund  www.imf.org World  economic 
Outlook. 
World Bank  World Bank  www.worldbank.org  World  economic 
information. 
IPSC  Institute for the protection and the 
security of citizen 
ipsc.jrc.ec.europa.eu Research  on 
citizen security. 
Table 2.  Sources of information identified. 